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The Long American Grain Invasion of Britain: Market integration 
and the wheat trade between North America and Britain from the 
Eighteenth Century1 
Paul Sharp [paul.sharp@econ.ku.dk] 
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
Studiestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark 
 
Abstract: This paper provides evidence that transatlantic commodity market integration began prior to the 
“first era of globalization” at the end of the nineteenth century. It does so by giving a long term perspective 
to the story of the development of an Atlantic Economy in wheat between the United States and Britain. 
Both trade statistics and contemporary comment reveal the importance of this trade from the middle to late 
eighteenth century, long before the so-called grain invasion of the late nineteenth century. Using data on 
imports from America and a large volume of substantiating primary evidence, specific periods are 
identified when market integration might have been possible. Using price data for wheat in America and 
Britain, some evidence is found that markets were integrated, but this process was continuously being 
interrupted by “exogenous” events, such as trade policy, war and politics. Transportation costs cannot be 
seen to be the driving force behind periods of increased trade, which are more attributable to the absence of 
these exogenous events. 
 
JEL Classifications: N7 
Keywords: Grain invasion, wheat, globalization, American colonial trade 
                                                 
1 The author thanks the European Commission for financial support through the Marie Curie Research Training 
Network “Unifying the European Experience”. 
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1.  Introduction 
“Sire, have you not taken away the only remedy for this scarcity; the only relief to which we can 
now look under a bad harvest – by closing the corn market of America.” 
– Brougham, Parliamentary Debate, 18122 
 
The concept and consequences of globalization have recently enjoyed a vast amount of scholarly 
attention. In this literature economic historians have played a key role in demonstrating that 
globalization is not a new phenomenon, but rather something that has occurred in a series of waves, 
the first of which was in the nineteenth century (see for example O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999). 
Moreover, this body of research has been at pains to point out that the traditional indicators, such as 
volumes of trade in the case of commodity markets, are not sufficient when defining globalization. 
Trade volumes have for example increased in earlier periods, such as with the discovery of the 
Americas by Europeans. Globalization is thus defined as commodity market integration, with the 
increase in trade merely a result of this. 
Might economic historians be guilty of the same mistake, however, when choosing in which 
period to date the “first era of globalization”? Focus has naturally been directed at the late 
nineteenth century, when trade volumes boomed, and has concentrated primarily on the trade in 
wheat between the US and the UK. This trade took off at the end of the nineteenth century after a 
period of many decades of high protectionism. With very few exceptions, however, and despite this 
scholarly enthusiasm for the famous “Grain Invasion” of the late nineteenth century, very little 
attention has been paid to the trade in wheat between America and Britain going back even further 
to a time when volumes were relatively small: the eighteenth century.3 And this despite the finding 
long ago by Shepherd & Walton (1972) that wheat and flour exports were of one of the major 
export commodities of the colonies, only exceeded in importance by tobacco.  
Indeed, politicians and farmers of the mid- to late nineteenth century seem to have been under 
the impression that the importance of grain imports from North America started in their time, and 
economic historians seem to have been content to accept this (see for example O’Rourke & 
Williamson 1999). That trade volumes were modest, however, does not mean that there was no 
globalization or commodity market integration. Moreover, although the levels of trade in wheat 
between the US and the UK were relatively small, they were in fact not insignificant for many 
years, meaning that market integration was certainly possible. The difficulty of looking for market 
integration in this period, is, however, that trade was continuously being cut off by various 
“exogenous” events, such as biological phenomena, war and politics. These correspond to those 
                                                 
2 Quoted by Galpin (1922, p. 24). 
3 There has been more attention on the export of wheat from Britain, see for example Ormrod (1985). 
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identified by O’Rourke (2006) who notes the possibility that market integration (globalization) 
might have started earlier if it had not been for the impact of such shocks4. 
This paper considers the development of the trade in wheat between America and Britain 
from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. No apology is 
made for the focus on just two countries and one commodity. Similar studies have formed the basis 
of our understanding of market integration in the late nineteenth century. 
The pre-nineteenth century transatlantic grain trade has been almost completely neglected in 
the recent literature. It is in fact necessary to go back to the work of W. Freeman Galpin (1922, 
1925) to find otherwise. Galpin painstakingly establishes the importance of the American supply of 
grain for Britons at home and to British forces stationed in Spain and Portugal during the French 
and Napoleonic Wars. However, even he was under the impression that the “importance… of 
American grain in English history presented itself for the first time during the Napoleonic era”. He 
does not, however, back his assertion up with any evidence. 
Establishing that there was market integration in the eighteenth century requires a number of 
different steps. First, in section 2 the fact that there was a trade in grain between America and 
Britain stretching back to the early years of the eighteenth century is established by looking at the 
available data on wheat imports from America to Britain from 1697 to 1899. This means that 
evidence for market integration cannot be dismissed as spurious. Comparing the level of imports 
with estimates of total wheat consumption in each year also helps motivate the study of this 
important trade. In section 3 the “exogenous” episodes which might be expected to impact on 
market integration are identified. These correspond to years of below-trend wheat trade as identified 
from the data presented in section 2 and are explained with reference to evidence mainly gathered 
from a number of primary sources. This section also demonstrates the importance attached by 
eighteenth century Britons to the supply of grain from America, a fact not recognized in recent 
work. Section 4 looks at the behaviour of prices over the period and tests for market integration. 
Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Jacks (2005, 2006) was one of the first to note that transatlantic market integration began prior to the second half of 
the nineteenth century and this point has recently been conceded by Williamson (2008). 
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2. The long grain invasion of Britain 
The available data on wheat imports from the North American Colonies and the United States is 
illustrated in figure 1, which covers the period from 1697, when the office of Inspector General of 
Imports and Exports was established, with the first imports of wheat from North America recorded 
in the 1720s.5. The data is plotted on a logarithmic scale in order to better illustrate the variability of 
imports in the period before the 1870s. Unfortunately, plotting the data in this way means that years 
with zero imports appear as missing observations. In fact, data is available for every year. 
Of course, the levels of imports in the eighteenth century are tiny compared to later years. 
However, population was also rather smaller, so in order to get an idea of the importance of these 
imports it is useful to compare the level of imports from America with total imports and estimates 
of total consumption of wheat in Britain. 
Collins (1975) provides a number of estimates of annual wheat consumption per head in the 
nineteenth century, ranging from 6 to nearly 9 bushels. He also shows, however, that this was 
                                                 
5 The data from 1697-1787 is for wheat only and comes from BPP (1789). The data includes trifling imports from 
Canada. Before 1755 the data does not include Scotland. Afterwards it is for the island of Great Britain. I have not been 
able to locate data for the years 1788-1791. From 1792 all imports are for wheat and wheat flour combined.  From 
1792-1799 they are from BPP (1815), from 1800-1824 they are from BPP (1827a), from 1825-1828 from BPP (1827b), 
from 1829-1830 from BPP (1832), from 1829-1839 from BPP (1843) and from 1840-1899 from the Annual Statements 
of Trade 1853-1900. Total imports (including from Ireland) are taken from BPP (1843) until 1842 and the Annual 
Statements of Trade 1853-1900. Where this is not already done in the sources, imports of wheat (measured by volume: 
quarters) is added to imports of wheat flour (measured by weight: hundredweight, cwt) using the assumption that there 
are 392 lbs (i.e. 3.5 cwt) of flour to a quarter of wheat (the assumption made in British Parliamentary Papers). For later 
years imports of wheat are also recorded by weight, and for the sake of comparison it is thus assumed that there are 4.4 
cwt of wheat to the quarter. 
 
Figure 1: UK imports of wheat and wheat flour from North American 
Colonies / United States 1697-1899
(Log scale)
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changing over time, since in 1800 only 66 per cent of grain consumption was for wheat, as opposed 
to 88 per cent in 1850 and 97 per cent in 1900. This means that an assumption of 0.9 quarters (over 
seven bushels) of wheat per person per year is almost certainly an overestimate for the eighteenth 
century. Nevertheless, making this fairly heroic assumption and multiplying it by the population 
statistics compiled by Wrigley & Schofield (1981) and Mitchell & Deane (1953, pp. 8-9) it is 
possible to get an idea of the levels of consumption.  
As figure 2 illustrates, even in the late 1700s imports from America were often supplying up 
to about three or four per cent of consumption. They were thus supplying a significant share of the 
population. Using data on total imports it is also possible to give an impression of the relative 
importance of US imports compared to those from other countries: for many years they were are a 
large proportion of total imports. The rest of the imports are predominantly coming from 
Prussia/“Germany”, which for most years supplies in excess of half of all imports. The lesson is 
nevertheless clear: the United States’ importance as a grain exporting country dates to the 
eighteenth century. There are, however, large fluctuations. 
3. Explaining the fluctuations 
It turns out that these fluctuations are surprisingly easy to explain. They are all the result of 
exogenous shocks to the developing Atlantic Economy, which in some cases cause imports to 
dwindle to a trickle for many years. It is convenient to divide this story into three periods: one until 
the 1760s and ‘70s, when Britain was a net exporter of wheat; the next from the industrial 
revolution and the accompanying population boom, which resulted in Britain becoming a net 
importer up until the end of the French and Napoleonic Wars; and finally from the introduction of 
Figure 2: Imports of wheat as a percentage of consumption 1725-1860
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extreme protectionism after 1815 until the abolition of the Corn Laws sliding scale in 1849. The 
period after the repeal of the Corn Laws, when American grain assumes its huge importance, which 
it maintains until the 1930s, is covered by Sharp (2007). 
3.1 Imports as a response to harvest failure: The period until 1773 
It turns out that the sporadic imports of wheat in the first period are easily explained by harvest 
failure in Britain. This can be seen by comparing the years in which imports are present with the 
annual evidence on English harvests collected by Jones (1964). So, for example, Jones records that 
1728 and 1729 (the first years for which he collects evidence) were marked by “great dearth”.  And 
indeed, we find that American imports are first present in 1729. 1730 to 1739 was, however, a 
decade of “good harvests”, and we find that American imports are entirely absent until 1740, 
following a “wet, late harvest” in 1739 and “extraordinary scarcity” in 1740. Jones then records that 
harvests were generally excellent until 1755, when the harvest was late, and 1756, “a year of 
scarcity”. And of course we then find that imports from America appear in 1756 and 1757. The 
success of American exporters in these years provoked an embargo on “all American vessels laden 
with corn, flour, &c” in 1757 (Pitt 1792, p. 266) Harvests are then recorded as being good until 
1766, 1767 and 1768 which were all marked by food riots. This resulted in an embargo on the 
exportation of corn from England. Imports from America were then again welcome (Pitt 1792, p. 
368), indeed, an “Act for allowing the Importation of Wheat and Wheat-flour from His Majesty’s 
Colonies in America, into this Kingdom, for a Time to be limited, free of Duty” was passed in 1766 
(BPP 1766, p. 29) and was continued the following year (BPP 1767, p. 429). 
Until this point we have learned nothing new: imports were largely the consequence of 
scarcity at home, a point well known from previous studies. However, it might be noted that 
American farmers were clearly looked to as a source of supply after a bad harvest, and were also 
obviously able to react. Every year there was a bad harvest the American colonies stepped in to help 
meet the deficit. 
During this period, however, America was mostly seen as competition for British producers, 
and Britain was of course still at this time a net-exporter of grain. As early as 1713 a parliamentary 
committee heard of the quality of American wheat, superior to that Britain was able to export to the 
continent (BPP 1713, p. 368) and similar concerns were expressed in 1737 (BPP 1737, p. 116).  
Already in 1740 a bill was read in parliament which proposed to prohibit the exportation of 
grain from North America, which met with condemnation by traders in the colonies themselves, as 
well as merchants involved in the trade in London (BPP 1740). In 1742, a petition was sent to 
Parliament “in Behalf… all the Farmers in Great-Britain” in which the petitioners made clear their 
fear that “great Quantities of Corn Land” were to be brought into production, and that wheat would 
be exported into Europe “at those Places, which always have been the British Farmers Markets”, 
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and requesting that Parliament “prohibit the Exportation of Corn from America into Europe, and 
other Things that may prejudice the British Farmer and Tradesman”. A petition from “several 
Merchants of London” also makes the point that they are unable to compete with the Americans on 
exports of wheat to the Continent (BPP 1749, p. 1032). 
The advantages enjoyed by American farmers were concisely summarized by William Ellis, a 
farmer, in a letter from 1742. He expresses concern that Americans “by their great Increase of 
Land… have been tempted… to carry on the Cultivation of Corn, and have made such Progress in 
its Improvements, that they are become Masters of prodigious Crops of Grain, especially the finest 
of Wheat, by enjoying, perhaps, one of the best Opportunities the World affords” and that “they 
have the richest of Land both dry and wet, a very potent Influence from the Sun’s Heat, their 
Acknowledgement or Rent, little or nothing, their Slaves labour for a Trifle Charge, and withal the 
great Cheapness and Conveniency of Water Carriage for transporting their Corn into Europe, to 
the infinite prejudice of Great-Britain.” (Ellis 1750, emphasis added). The last point he makes is 
one that has sometimes been neglected by economic historians when focussing on the role of 
transoceanic transportations costs: the fact that oceanic transport is relatively cheap compared to 
land or canal transport, meaning that the considerable distance between Britain and America need 
not necessarily imply large barriers to trade. This point will be taken up again in section 3.4. 
What is clear, however, is that the importance of American wheat during these years was only 
apparent during times of harvest failure and contemporary comment focussed for most years on the 
problems of competing with this supply for foreign markets. 
3.2 The first era of free trade: 1773 to 1815 
From the 1770s something changes however, perhaps not coincidentally at the same time as Britain 
industrialized, experienced a population boom and started to become a permanent net importer of 
wheat. 1771 and 1772 are recorded by Jones as being years of poor harvests, and American supply 
seems to respond in the usual way. Harvests are however recorded as being “fine” in 1773, 
unremarkable but not bad in 1774 and even “plentiful” in 1775, and yet these years see the 
beginning of large-scale imports from America. Although imports continue to fluctuate greatly after 
this date, there is no longer the clear correspondence between imports and scarcity that there was in 
the earlier period. 
It is probably no coincidence that large volumes of American grain started in arrive in British 
ports after the enactment of the Corn Law of 1774, which ushered in a period of “practically free” 
trade in grain, as stated in a report of an 1821 Parliamentary Select Committee (BPP 1821, p. 15). 
From 1791 the Corn Laws became more protectionist, but the onset of the French and Napoleonic 
Wars drove prices so high that only nominal duties were payable on imports (Sharp 2006). The 
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considerable swings in imports from the US we see during this period do, therefore, not seem to be 
principally related to trade policy. Neither can they be explained by harvest failure in the UK. 
The sudden dearth of imports from America after 1775 is actually very easy to explain. First, 
there was the American War of Independence from 1775-1783 which of course had some impact on 
wheat and flour production in America. Hunter (2005) notes three phases of the impact of the war: 
the first until 1777, which saw an increase in demand. Then, with the British invasion of the 
Philadelphia region in 1777, there was difficulty until 1779. For example, General George 
Washington ordered the removal of millstones to prevent the British from acquiring flour and the 
British targeted merchant mills. In addition, throughout the war, the British intermittently from 
1776 tried to mount a blockade and in 1778 Congress imposed its own embargo, prohibiting the 
export of grain and flour, although some illegal exports were possible. The overseas trade was 
reopened in 1780 and, combined with good harvests, this marked the beginning of the final phase, 
one of recovery. 
Perhaps more important, however, was the impact of the Hessian fly invasion from 1776 
which decimated wheat crops. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate data for wheat imports 
from America for the years 1787-1791. It is known, however, that in 1788 Philadelphia merchants 
were planning to ship large amounts of wheat to England, and that this resulted in a total ban on 
wheat imports from the United States from June 25 that year. How much this ban was attributable to 
a fear of introducing the fly to England and causing “a Calamity of much more extensive and fatal 
Consequences than the Admission of the Plague”, and how much was due to an antagonism towards 
the newly independent United States is unclear, although Pauly (2002) notes that the Privy Council 
Committee for Trade were favourable towards ideas that would realign imperial trade and allow the 
Americans to suffer the consequences of independence. They also favoured policies that would 
stimulate home production at a time when higher general tariffs were not politically feasible. 
The ban led to a considerable amount of debate and the publication by Parliament in March 
1789 of a pamphlet, Proceedings of His Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, and 
Information Received, Respecting an Insect, Supposed to Infest the Wheat of the Territories of the 
United States of America, which attempted to justify the ban to the world6. The ban was poorly 
timed, however, because harvest failures in 1788 and 1789 made Britain’s dependence on imports 
only too clear. The ban was reversed, and HMS Echo arrived in New York in February 1790 with 
the news (Pauly 2002). It appears likely that British leaders decided in 1789 that the United States 
would in the future be an important reserve food supply, and that the risk posed by French-style 
revolution was greater than that posed by the fly (Ritcheson 1969, cited by Pauly). 
                                                 
6 This useful publication furnished the statistical information on early wheat imports from America used in this paper. 
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Hunter (2005) notes that “wheat and flour together served as a cornerstone of America’s 
newly independent transatlantic commerce” and from an early date, wheat enjoyed a special status, 
Revolutionaries considering it to be the “ideal republican crop” in contrast to tobacco, with its 
association with “royal government, debt, slavery and poor agricultural practices” (Matson 2006, p. 
246). The Hessian Fly itself might even have contributed to the long-run success of American wheat 
production, since it helped spur agricultural improvement, through for example experiments in 
diversification (Matson 2006, chapter eight). A similar point is made by Hunter (2005), who 
suggests that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars helped to ensure America’s later 
success in wheat and flour exports by stimulating the adoption of new milling technologies and 
regional specialization. 
The years from 1792 are of course marked by war. Generally imports from the United States 
continued their upwards trend, although some years stand out for having no imports or particularly 
high levels of imports. Wheat exports from America to all destinations started dropping from 1792 
when the Hessian fly arrived in Delaware and Maryland, at that time the centres of production. 
From 1795 to 1799 America virtually ceased exporting wheat, the recovery only coming in the first 
years of the nineteenth century (Matson 2006, p. 253). In vain successive Committees of the British 
Privy Council asked witnesses about the possibility of imports from the United States (BPP 1795a). 
The recovery when it came, however, was quite impressive. Harvests in Europe were poor in 
1799, but those of America were abundant and mostly free of the Hessian fly. Parliament enacted 
measures for bounties on the import of American wheat (Galpin 1925, p. 136) and by 1801 very 
large imports of American wheat came in. Indeed, in this year “the Americans so completely 
drained themselves of corn for this traffic, that bread became as dear, or dearer, at New York, than 
it was in England” (Board of Agriculture 1806, p. 277). Despite this, a combination of good 
harvests in England and poor harvests in the US contributed to the low level of imports from the US 
in the following years. 
The imposition of Napoleon’s Continental System from late 1806 presented a great 
opportunity for American exporters, however, and contributed to the large volume of imports from 
the US in 1807, the year in which the US consul at Liverpool was led to declare that “such 
quantities of wheat and flour from the United States have lately poured into this market that prices 
have declined”7. This encouraged the belief “in the permanency of this seemingly inexhaustible 
granary” (Galpin 1925, p. 44). However, in the wake of the Royal Navy’s impressment of American 
citizens on the high seas, the United States itself imposed a trade embargo from 1807, reflected in 
testimony before a British parliamentary committee that trade in London declined in 1808 after the 
American embargo (Galpin 1922, p. 24). However, illegal wheat exports continued and Napoleon 
                                                 
7 Quoted in Galpin (1922, p. 24) 
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was quick to conclude that it was impossible to starve Britain, at least in part due to the availability 
of supplies from the United States. He thus soon, in the wake of bumper harvests in France, allowed 
exports of grain to resume (Galpin 1925, p. 168). There is no doubt, however, that the years of the 
embargo and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 were an important dampener on the level of trade 
(Galpin 1925, p. 147). 
From this point on relations between the US and the UK gradually deteriorated and this, 
combined with good harvests in Europe, contributed to the low level of imports from America. The 
last years of the Napoleonic Wars saw the beginning of a new war, this time between the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The war lasted from the summer of 1812 to the beginning of 1815 
and witnessed a blockade by the British of the American coastline (Galpin 1925, p. 149). 
Although farmers continued to voice predictable concerns8, what is notable about 
contemporary comment over this period is rather than it changes from being focussed on the danger 
of American competition to a focus on the opportunities the American supply presented for meeting 
the demands of a growing population in Britain. Donaldson (1775), previously of the Jamaican 
government, wrote in a letter to the king that “The lands so liberally granted in America should be 
cultivated… and the mother country supplied from their industry; what magazines of corn might we 
hope to see from such resources!” This idea became more and more widely accepted, so that by 
1790, a report of the British Privy Council (BPP 1790) concluded that “whenever the crops fail, in 
any degree, the deficiency can only be supplied from the harvests of America” (Glasgow Chamber 
of Commerce and Manufactures 1790). Although John Lord Sheffield argues vehemently against 
this conclusion in his Observations on the Commerce of the United States, other commentators were 
quick to back it up (Sheffield 17xx, Anon 17xx). A committee “on the high price of corn” looked 
first to the United States and the “abundant” supply there as a means of affording relief caused in 
part by the poor harvest in England (BPP 1795b, p. 85). By 1800, the British Board of Agriculture 
stated that “America be, or is hereafter to be the granary of Europe” (Board of Agriculture 1800, p. 
148). A committee to “consider of the present high price of provisions” in 1801 also looked to 
America (BPP 1801a, p. 7, BPP 1801b, p. 8) as did a committee of 1805 (BPP 1805, p. 13). 
Although the available statistics do not discriminate between imports of wheat and imports of 
wheat flour, it seems that most imports during these years were in fact of flour, in contrast to the 
years before the onset of the French Wars, when imports of wheat were “very considerable” (BPP 
1813, p. 115). This caused millers to complain, and evidence was presented before a select 
committee in 1813 from a miller to the effect that the imports of flour from the United States in 
1806, 1807, 1809 and 1810 were bad for millers (BPP 1813, p. 99). Indeed, it seems they had good 
                                                 
8 For example, “A Farmer” writing in 1773 writes that “The only country from whence we can apprehend such an 
importation [of grain which could sell cheaper than British farmers could sell it for] is America” (A Farmer, 1773). 
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reason to. Select Committees heard that US flour was of very high quality owing to a sophisticated 
system of inspections and branding, and that it was easy to transport (BPP 1813, BPP 1814). 
3.3 Prohibitive tariffs and the movement to free trade: 1815 to 1849 
With peace, the Corn Laws soon became protectionist and this is reflected by the decline in 
American imports after 1818 (when prices fell sufficiently from wartime levels for imports to be 
prohibited under the terms of the Corn Law of 1815). Imports only really recovered with the 
introduction of the new Corn Law and the sliding scale of 1828 at which point swings in imports 
become clearly related to swings in import duties, which varied considerably from year to year 
(Sharp 2006), although it might be noted that during the 1830s America was again suffering from 
attacks of the Hessian fly. 
In general, however, these years see a gradual decline in interest in the supply from America. 
Mentions in Parliamentary reports are rare9 despite the huge volume of material published by 
Parliament during the debate in the run up to the repeal of the Corn Laws. So William Jacob’s 
famous report on the “Agriculture and Corn of some of the Continental States of Europe” (BPP 
1827) was just that, with no mention of America, and before a select committee in 1833 he 
dismissed the importance of the American supply (BPP 1833, p. 6). 
With the repeal of the sliding scale in 1849, import duties become insignificant and were 
eventually abolished, allowing the great expansion of trade with America which was to become 
known as the Grain Invasion. 
An important lesson from this paper is thus an understanding of the importance of the 
American grain supply far back into the eighteenth century10. That this was the case is strikingly 
brought home by the following: In 1791 a petition was presented to the House of Commons by 
“Merchants of the City of London, concerned in the Commerce with the United States of America” 
(BPP 1791b, p.445) and petitions were received from Norwich, Somerset, Dorset, making it clear 
that these areas were unable to supply themselves with grain (BPP 1791b, pp. 466-467). A petition 
from Bailiffs and Burgesses of the Borough of Bridport, Dorset explicitly requested that Bridport be 
made a “Granary Port” so that the town might enjoy a “greater Connection with America, and that 
the Merchants will thereby be enabled to import Wheat, in Part, for their Manufacturies” (BPP 
1791b, p.469). Even more explicitly a “Petition from the Mayor, Merchants, and principal 
Inhabitants, of the City of Bristol” stated that “the Western Part of the Kingdom does not grown 
Corn sufficient for the Consumption of its Inhabitants” and relied on imports “chiefly from 
                                                 
9 Those there are concern rumours of small-scale smuggling of American grain via Canada (BPP 1820, pp. 18, 30 & 35; 
BPP 1821, pp. 277, 314-5 & 320-1; BPP 1836a, p. 43; BPP 1836b, pp. 113-4) and a brief mention that the Corn Laws 
harmed bilateral trade with the United States (BPP 1840). 
10 There is also some evidence of its importance for other European countries, such as Portugal and Spain (Galpin 1922) 
and France (Kaplan 1976, p. 634). 
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America” through the port of Bristol (BPP 1791b, p. 653). If American crops had not have been 
ruined by the Hessian fly, and war had not intervened, might not the Anti-Corn Law League have 
emerged at this time? And then quite possibly we would now date the grain invasion – and possibly 
even the origins of globalization – to the late 1700s, rather than a century later.  
3.4 The role of transportation costs 
Until now no mention has been made of the role of transportation costs, which are often cited as 
being the main reason for the grain invasion of the late nineteenth century. 
Recent research on the grain invasion of the late nineteenth century has concentrated on the 
role of falling domestic transportation costs, allowing grain to be shipped more easily from new 
production areas as the centre of American agriculture moved westward. However, the role of 
domestic transportation costs must have been negligible for the early days of the Atlantic wheat 
economy, since the vast majority of American wheat was grown near the east coast. Indeed, even as 
late as 1839, the geographic centre of production was east of Wheeling, (West) Virginia, with 
cultivation concentrated in Ohio and upstate New York and relatively little grown as far west as 
Illinois (Olmstead & Rhode 2002, p. 936). 
The evidence on transatlantic rates is sketchy, but intriguingly, it appears that freight rates 
were highest at the times when imports were greatest. For example, Douglass North’s British import 
freight rate index, available from 1790, is highest in the years 1799-1801 and again in 1807, which 
correspond to years when imports from America were greatest. No “meaningful” freight index is 
available from 1808-1813, when “freights rose to very high levels”, but even for these years 
historically significant levels of wheat imports were arriving from the United States for most years. 
This pattern repeats itself in the figures North collected for the East Coast American freight factor 
for wheat, available from 1826. This is again highest from 1829-1831 and from 1845-47, the years 
of greatest imports11 (North 1958). Unless we are to believe that high transportation costs 
encouraged imports, then one possible alternative explanation is that the high volumes of imports 
were pushing up demand for shipping and increasing freight rates. 
Some evidence on transatlantic costs of transporting wheat is available for the eighteenth 
century. For example, A Farmer (1773, p. 102) gives a detailed breakdown of the cost of 
transporting wheat from America, although some of his assumptions might be rather suspect12, 
since he is trying to show that British farmers have nothing to fear from imports. But by far the 
largest cost he records is for freight, which amounts to 8 shillings per quarter of wheat. By 1791, 
information received by the Committee of Privy Council for Trade suggested that it amounted to 8s. 
                                                 
11 He provides no data for the years 1839-1841, when imports were also high. 
12 Such as that 10 per cent must be added to the cost due to waste and damage and an additional cost due to the decline 
in value because the grain has been on the ship for too long. 
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8d. (BPP 1791a). Dividing this by the price of wheat in Britain for each year gives freight factors of 
15 and 17 per cent respectively, about the same as for most of the early nineteenth century and only 
marginally below that of the late nineteenth century, after the “transport revolution” (Sharp 2007). 
Perhaps surprisingly, in evidence before a select committee in 1821, one witness describes the 
difficulty of Irish competing with American flour due to the cheapness of freight. It was actually 
cheaper to ship flour from America to Liverpool than from Ireland through Dublin to Liverpool, 
which required the use of expensive canal transport (BPP 1821, p. 319). 
In short, it seems that at no time were transportation costs an important barrier to trade. 
Indeed, this was the point made long ago by Ellis (1750) - as quoted above. 
4. Looking for market integration 
With the available statistical evidence we cannot hope to fulfil the stringent conditions for testing 
market integration described for example in Persson (2004). There is no record of, for example, 
grain qualities, the only price information being for “wheat” in various markets. Nevertheless, when 
the available data are assembled, it does in fact seem possible to draw some meaningful 
conclusions. 
Figure 3: Price of American and British wheat 1700-1900
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Looking at figure 313, the first thing that is striking is how the prices move together over the 
long run. The usual way of testing for long run market integration (or, more precisely, that the 
trading cost adjusted law of one price is valid) is to test for cointegration between the series (see for 
example Ejrnæs, Persson & Rich, 2008). 
Cointegration is tested for using Dynamic OLS (DOLS) by estimating the following model: 
0 1 1 2 2 3 4 1 5 2 6t t t t t t tpuk puk puk pus pus pus tβ β β β β β β ε− − − −= + + + + + + +   (1) 
where puk and pus are the logarithms to the UK and US prices respectively, t is the trend and tε  is 
the error term, which is assumed to be iid normally distributed. This estimation technique has the 
advantage, compared to the usual static Engle-Granger approach, that the model is well-specified 
(since it includes dynamic effects) so, given cointegration, t-ratios constructed from the standard 
errors follow standard normal distributions under the null. 
Initially the model is estimated for the whole of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
estimation results and some model specification tests are given in appendix A1. It is clear that the 
model is not well specified, because the iid normality assumption for the residuals is not met. This 
is due to the presence of unmodelled events giving large residuals for the years 1704, 1714, 1715, 
1727, 1741 and 1756. After introducing dummies for these years, the model is much better specified 
- see appendix A2. We can now solve for the static long-run solution of the model (the estimation is 
performed using PCGive) and check for cointegration. This is shown in appendix A3. 
The coefficient to pus is 0.93, implying that US and UK prices almost perfectly follow each 
other in the long run. Moreover, the unit root t-statistic, which gives the test for the null of no 
cointegration, is -9.29 – and thus very strong evidence of cointegration. 
In appendix A4, the sample has been restricted to the eighteenth century only, and as is to be 
expected the evidence for market integration is less strong. Nevertheless, the long-run coefficient to 
pus is still 0.78 and the unit root t-statistic is -7.81. The conclusion must be that prices were 
cointegrated and thus markets integrated in the eighteenth century – to a lesser extent than in the 
nineteenth century, but still convincingly so, especially in the light of the fact that this period 
includes many years before the trade in wheat really took off. 
Another measure which is commonly referred to when assessing the degree of market 
integration is the price gap between the two markets. This is illustrated in figure 4. 
                                                 
13 The data for Britain is taken from Mitchell & Deane (1953) and is the “Winchester” series until 1770, and thereafter 
the Gazette series. The American data is taken from Carter et al (2006). Until 1783 the prices are taken from series 
Eg252 converted from Pennsylvania shillings to UK currency using the exchange rates given in series Eg318. No prices 
are available between 1776-83, and the price has thus assumed to be unchanging for these years. From 1784 the prices 
are in dollars per bushel from series Cc205-208 converted to British shillings per quarter using the exchange rates given 
in Officer (2008). The missing exchange rates before 1791 are assumed to be the same as in 1791. In all cases, volumes 
are converted to imperial quarters using the fact that there are 8.256 American bushels to the imperial quarter. 
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Figure 4: Price gap between UK and US
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Except for extraordinary periods, such as during the American Civil War, and a time during 
the 1830s when American harvests were ravished by the Hessian fly, the price gap is positive over 
the entire period. The general trend is illustrated by the ten year moving average: for the part of the 
eighteenth century when the wheat trade was significant, the price gap fluctuates around a level of 
about 10 shillings per quarter, clearly compatible with the likely level of trading costs given in 
section 3.4 and thus with the trading costs adjusted law of one price. Prior to this, there is little or no 
trade, and the price gap does indeed seem on average to exceed the level of trading costs. After the 
repeal of the Corn Laws the gap falls to around half this level in line with the fall in transatlantic 
shipping costs (Persson 2004). The disruption caused by the Napoleonic Wars and the Corn Laws 
(see Sharp 2006) is also clear. 
Looking more closely at the data, the times when trade is possible do indeed seem to be 
reflected in a narrowing of the price gap, most notably after the liberalization of trade in the 1770s, 
but even for shorter periods, such as around the extraordinary year of imports in 1807 and the short 
lived period of free trade immediately following the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, when trade was 
possible, there was a marked tendency of prices to respond in accordance with the law of one price. 
To summarize, using one traditional measure of market integration, the degree of 
cointegration, markets were integrated. Looking at the price gaps adds another dimension, showing 
the importance of understanding exogenous events when looking at divergence from the law of one 
price. However, the data point to trade being quite possible throughout the eighteenth century, if it 
hadn’t been for the various disruptions outlined in section 3. 
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Ideally, it would be possible to examine the speed of adjustment back to the law of one price 
equilibrium. However, the data are not frequent enough to allow for testing in the sense described 
by Ejrnæs et al (2008). Clearly, however, when trade was relatively free, prices converged and 
levels of imports could reach those first experienced again half a century later. 
5. Conclusion 
The most important lesson from this paper is that, if we accept market integration as the appropriate 
definition of globalization, then it is necessary to look beyond the outcome variable – increasing 
levels of trade – when deciding when to date the first era of globalization. 
Some degree of long run market integration was already present in the trade in wheat between 
the US and the UK from the eighteenth century. This trade was not insignificant, as the words and 
actions of contemporaries confirms. The change in the nineteenth century was not that prices began 
to follow each other, and neither was it particularly significant that the price gap narrowed (Persson 
2004). The important change was that prices adjusted faster towards the law of one price 
equilibrium, as demonstrated by Ejrnæs et al (2008). It is not possible to test for this with the 
eighteenth century data, but it is clear that trade was too sporadic for markets to develop 
sufficiently. 
What is interesting, however, is that trade could and did increase during the periods when 
exogenous events did not preclude this from happening. Volumes could not feasibly have been as 
high as they were by the end of the nineteenth century (when the US was exporting more than she 
produced in total in the eighteenth century), but they were significant. And importantly this was 
without the transport revolution. Whether we call this globalization or not, it is an important 
precursor to the globalization story of the nineteenth century, and an illustration of the beginning of 
the story of the American grain invasion of Britain. 
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Appendix 
A1: The DOLS analysis without dummies 
EQ( 1) Modelling LPUK by OLS (using data.xls) 
       The estimation sample is: 1702 to 1900 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
LPUK_1               0.767806    0.06819     11.3   0.000   0.3977 
LPUK_2              -0.279665    0.06629    -4.22   0.000   0.0848 
Constant             0.403091     0.1130     3.57   0.000   0.0622 
LPUS                 0.517381    0.06353     8.14   0.000   0.2567 
LPUS_1              -0.292568    0.09260    -3.16   0.002   0.0494 
LPUS_2               0.249064    0.07296     3.41   0.001   0.0572 
Trend             -0.00108843  0.0002601    -4.18   0.000   0.0836 
 
sigma                0.152377  RSS                4.45800764 
R^2                  0.851496  F(6,192) =    183.5 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        95.5922  DW                       1.97 
no. of observations       199  no. of parameters           7 
mean(LPUK)            3.78847  var(LPUK)            0.150851 
 
AR 1-2 test:      F(2,190) =  0.50014 [0.6072]   
ARCH 1-1 test:    F(1,190) =   5.5104 [0.0199]*  
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   24.124 [0.0000]** 
hetero test:      F(12,179)=   2.4099 [0.0065]** 
hetero-X test:    F(27,164)=   2.6480 [0.0001]** 
RESET test:       F(1,191) =   1.8846 [0.1714]   
A2: The DOLS analysis with dummies 
EQ( 5) Modelling LPUK by OLS (using data.xls) 
       The estimation sample is: 1702 to 1900 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
LPUK_1               0.911237    0.05909     15.4   0.000   0.5611 
LPUK_2              -0.369837    0.05702    -6.49   0.000   0.1845 
Constant             0.365570    0.09445     3.87   0.000   0.0745 
LPUS                 0.577708    0.05369     10.8   0.000   0.3837 
LPUS_1              -0.387827    0.07847    -4.94   0.000   0.1161 
LPUS_2               0.234673    0.06143     3.82   0.000   0.0728 
Trend             -0.00100755  0.0002201    -4.58   0.000   0.1013 
DUM1741             -0.677971     0.1326    -5.11   0.000   0.1232 
DUM1704             -0.515863     0.1299    -3.97   0.000   0.0781 
DUM1715              0.551174     0.1310     4.21   0.000   0.0869 
DUM1714             -0.432781     0.1291    -3.35   0.001   0.0570 
DUM1727              0.493401     0.1283     3.85   0.000   0.0737 
DUM1756              0.416586     0.1278     3.26   0.001   0.0540 
 
sigma                0.126531  RSS                2.97789233 
R^2                  0.900801  F(12,186) =   140.8 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        135.739  DW                       1.86 
no. of observations       199  no. of parameters          13 
mean(LPUK)            3.78847  var(LPUK)            0.150851 
 
AR 1-2 test:      F(2,184) =   1.8452 [0.1609]   
ARCH 1-1 test:    F(1,184) =  0.15822 [0.6913]   
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   6.2016 [0.0450]*  
hetero test:      F(18,167)=   1.1098 [0.3467]   
hetero-X test:    F(33,152)=  0.94899 [0.5528]   
RESET test:       F(1,185) =  0.36735 [0.5452]   
A3: The static long-run equation for puk 
Solved static long-run equation for LPUK 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob 
Constant             0.797144     0.1839     4.33   0.000 
LPUS                 0.925760    0.05947     15.6   0.000 
Trend             -0.00219702  0.0004457    -4.93   0.000 
DUM1741              -1.47835     0.3553    -4.16   0.000 
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DUM1704              -1.12486     0.3006    -3.74   0.000 
DUM1715               1.20186     0.3164     3.80   0.000 
DUM1714             -0.943700     0.3023    -3.12   0.002 
DUM1727               1.07589     0.3035     3.54   0.000 
DUM1756              0.908386     0.3012     3.02   0.003 
Long-run sigma = 0.275908 
 
ECM = LPUK - 0.797144 - 0.92576*LPUS + 0.00219702*Trend + 1.47835*DUM1741 
       + 1.12486*DUM1704 - 1.20186*DUM1715 + 0.9437*DUM1714 - 1.07589*DUM1727 
       - 0.908386*DUM1756; 
WALD test: Chi^2(8) = 319.222 [0.0000] ** 
 
Analysis of lag structure, coefficients: 
            Lag 0    Lag 1    Lag 2      Sum  SE(Sum) 
LPUK           -1    0.911    -0.37   -0.459   0.0494 
Constant    0.366        0        0    0.366   0.0945 
LPUS        0.578   -0.388    0.235    0.425   0.0517 
Trend    -0.00101        0        0 -0.00101  0.00022 
DUM1741    -0.678        0        0   -0.678    0.133 
DUM1704    -0.516        0        0   -0.516     0.13 
DUM1715     0.551        0        0    0.551    0.131 
DUM1714    -0.433        0        0   -0.433    0.129 
DUM1727     0.493        0        0    0.493    0.128 
DUM1756     0.417        0        0    0.417    0.128 
 
Tests on the significance of each variable 
Variable     F-test        Value [  Prob]     Unit-root t-test 
LPUK         F(2,186) =   128.50 [0.0000]**        -9.2915** 
Constant     F(1,186) =   14.979 [0.0002]** 
LPUS         F(3,186) =   48.829 [0.0000]**         8.2059 
Trend        F(1,186) =   20.955 [0.0000]** 
DUM1741      F(1,186) =   26.131 [0.0000]**        -5.1119 
DUM1704      F(1,186) =   15.768 [0.0001]**        -3.9709 
DUM1715      F(1,186) =   17.691 [0.0000]**          4.206 
DUM1714      F(1,186) =   11.234 [0.0010]**        -3.3517 
DUM1727      F(1,186) =   14.790 [0.0002]**         3.8458 
DUM1756      F(1,186) =   10.623 [0.0013]**         3.2592 
 
Tests on the significance of each lag 
Lag 2        F(2,186) =   21.556 [0.0000]** 
Lag 1        F(2,186) =   119.05 [0.0000]** 
 
Tests on the significance of all lags up to 2 
Lag 2 - 2    F(2,186) =   21.556 [0.0000]** 
Lag 1 - 2    F(4,186) =   77.095 [0.0000]** 
A4: Analysis on eighteenth century only 
EQ( 7) Modelling LPUK by OLS (using data.xls) 
       The estimation sample is: 1702 to 1800 
 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob Part.R^2 
LPUK_1               0.850874    0.08160     10.4   0.000   0.5584 
LPUK_2              -0.483580    0.08115    -5.96   0.000   0.2922 
Constant             0.744067     0.2089     3.56   0.001   0.1285 
LPUS                 0.611467    0.09579     6.38   0.000   0.3215 
LPUS_1              -0.393217     0.1271    -3.09   0.003   0.1001 
LPUS_2               0.273629    0.09540     2.87   0.005   0.0873 
Trend            -0.000610206  0.0007637   -0.799   0.426   0.0074 
DUM1741             -0.623864     0.1516    -4.12   0.000   0.1646 
DUM1704             -0.514174     0.1471    -3.50   0.001   0.1245 
DUM1715              0.607341     0.1493     4.07   0.000   0.1614 
DUM1714             -0.388030     0.1471    -2.64   0.010   0.0749 
DUM1727              0.520639     0.1422     3.66   0.000   0.1348 
DUM1756              0.385914     0.1418     2.72   0.008   0.0793 
 
sigma                0.139355  RSS                1.67010933 
R^2                   0.84453  F(12,86) =    38.93 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood        61.5955  DW                       1.91 
no. of observations        99  no. of parameters          13 
mean(LPUK)            3.61125  var(LPUK)            0.108508 
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AR 1-2 test:      F(2,84)  =  0.26803 [0.7655]   
ARCH 1-1 test:    F(1,84)  =  0.40356 [0.5270]   
Normality test:   Chi^2(2) =   7.2839 [0.0262]*  
hetero test:      F(18,67) =  0.56939 [0.9091]   
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RESET test:       F(1,85)  =  0.81352 [0.3696]   
 
Solved static long-run equation for LPUK 
                  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  t-prob 
Constant              1.17601     0.2689     4.37   0.000 
LPUS                 0.777422    0.09790     7.94   0.000 
Trend            -0.000964437   0.001219   -0.791   0.431 
DUM1741             -0.986025     0.2938    -3.36   0.001 
DUM1704             -0.812658     0.2516    -3.23   0.002 
DUM1715              0.959909     0.2598     3.69   0.000 
DUM1714             -0.613286     0.2515    -2.44   0.017 
DUM1727              0.822876     0.2456     3.35   0.001 
DUM1756              0.609941     0.2447     2.49   0.015 
Long-run sigma = 0.220253 
 
ECM = LPUK - 1.17601 - 0.777422*LPUS + 0.000964437*Trend + 0.986025*DUM1741 
       + 0.812658*DUM1704 - 0.959909*DUM1715 + 0.613286*DUM1714 - 0.822876*DUM1727 
       - 0.609941*DUM1756; 
WALD test: Chi^2(8) = 144.533 [0.0000] ** 
 
Analysis of lag structure, coefficients: 
            Lag 0    Lag 1    Lag 2      Sum  SE(Sum) 
LPUK           -1    0.851   -0.484   -0.633    0.081 
Constant    0.744        0        0    0.744    0.209 
LPUS        0.611   -0.393    0.274    0.492   0.0796 
Trend    -0.00061        0        0 -0.00061 0.000764 
DUM1741    -0.624        0        0   -0.624    0.152 
DUM1704    -0.514        0        0   -0.514    0.147 
DUM1715     0.607        0        0    0.607    0.149 
DUM1714    -0.388        0        0   -0.388    0.147 
DUM1727     0.521        0        0    0.521    0.142 
DUM1756     0.386        0        0    0.386    0.142 
 
Tests on the significance of each variable 
Variable     F-test        Value [  Prob]     Unit-root t-test 
LPUK         F(2,86)  =   54.695 [0.0000]**        -7.8111** 
Constant     F(1,86)  =   12.684 [0.0006]** 
LPUS         F(3,86)  =   20.289 [0.0000]**         6.1809 
Trend        F(1,86)  =  0.63849 [0.4265]   
DUM1741      F(1,86)  =   16.940 [0.0001]**        -4.1158 
DUM1704      F(1,86)  =   12.225 [0.0007]**        -3.4965 
DUM1715      F(1,86)  =   16.555 [0.0001]**         4.0688 
DUM1714      F(1,86)  =   6.9599 [0.0099]**        -2.6382 
DUM1727      F(1,86)  =   13.398 [0.0004]**         3.6603 
DUM1756      F(1,86)  =   7.4043 [0.0079]**         2.7211 
 
Tests on the significance of each lag 
Lag 2        F(2,86)  =   18.850 [0.0000]** 
Lag 1        F(2,86)  =   55.826 [0.0000]** 
 
Tests on the significance of all lags up to 2 
Lag 2 - 2    F(2,86)  =   18.850 [0.0000]** 
Lag 1 - 2    F(4,86)  =   28.919 [0.0000]** 
 
